The House of Commons’ Select Committees are now more independent of government: but are they any better informed? by Dunleavy, Patrick & Gilson, Christopher
blogs.lse.ac.uk
Image Source: UK Parliament
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/2010/06/15/the-house-of-commons%e2%80%99-select-
committees-are-now-more-independent-of-government-but-are-they-any-better-informed/
The House of Commons’ Select Committees are now more
independent of government. But are they any better
informed?
Jun 15 2010
MPs exert their most effective influence on UK public policy via the network of select committees in the
Commons that monitor each Whitehall department and the cross-departmental Public Accounts Committee.
Last boosted in 1979 by the Thatcher administration, select committees have just won enhanced autonomy
from government and party control, with the election of their chairs and choice of their members by all MPs.
But Patrick Dunleavy and Chris Gilson argue that they also need to increase their salience in attracting MPs’
attention, and to urgently find a better way of researching the implementation issues they investigate.
It was the elegant Tory ‘wet’, Norman St John Stevas, who in 1979 founded the modern select committee
system, by setting up a committee to shadow each of the main departments of state. A minister despised by
(and eventually sacked by) Margaret Thatcher, St John Stevas none the less made the most important
advance in Parliament becoming a more effective policy-making influence ever since. The Committees
became more influential over time, forcing government ministers and departments to explain how policy
implementation has been undertaken and to explain where things have gone wrong. The committee Chairs
began to be paid a small token salary on top of their MPs basic pay, reflecting their increasing importance in
UK governance. And the Liaison Committee of chairs under Tony Blair began to quiz the Prime Minister
every six months.
One of MPs’ biggest grievances about the Committees, however, was that they were too open to control by
the party whips (especially the government whips, since governing party members are in a majority on each
committee). In particular, the whips could select the members (often apparently selecting perverse choices)
and try to rig the choice of committee chairs to give the government an easier ride. Some of the Blair era
manipulations of committees’ deliberations were breathtaking, such as the attempt to deny Gwyneth
Dunwoody the Chair of the Transport Committee in 2001. There were also concerns that former ministers
had on occasion been given the committee chair as an extension of the already pervasive system of party
‘patronage’.  And Labour ministers rarely missed the opportunity to delay setting up committees or calling
their first meetings for months after each general election.
Now with another liberal Tory, Sir George Young, as Leader
of the House of Commons, a programme of reforms drawn
up by the Labour MP Tony Wright in the last Parliament has
been fully implemented which should curb future abuses.
Essentially the key changes enhance the committees’
independence and their ability to form a ‘corporate’ or cross-
party identity to counteract the ever-present partisanship in
the Commons and to push for information and explanations
in the interest of better scrutiny and good government.
The Committee chairs have now been elected for the first
time, producing a balanced set of government party and
opposition chairs, and with MPs as a whole clearly opting for
the more independent-minded and dedicated candidates.
The next stage will be that MPs as a whole settle the
committee memberships, a complex task that has now been
taken out of the whips’ control. Parliament also has until 29
July to actually form the Committees, and with rumours
washing around Westminster that actually almost no
legislation is ready to be considered, this seems like a good
opportunity for the  committees to kick off their activities
promptly.
The reforms enacted have also done a little to address a
second problem that has plagued the committees, namely
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those MPs appointed to them. A recent study of the longest-
lived and most influential committee, the Public Accounts
Committee, showed that over a long period up to 2009 the average attendance of its members was just 45
per cent of meetings. Yet the PAC has a critically important role, scrutinizing public spending and reviewing
more than 60 reports a year from the National Audit Office. The new rules enacted by the Commons mean
that any member of PAC or one of the select committees who fails to show up for 60 per cent of meetings will
be automatically removed from the relevant Committee.
A third key problem remains untouched, however, namely the plain obsolescence of the predominant way in
which committees operate, without any capacity to do research or independent information-gathering of their
own. Each committee has a Clerk (usually a generalist official), whose role is mainly procedural and focuses
on keeping the committee’s secretarial staff on top of its many papers and activities. In addition there is a
researcher called ‘committee specialist’, often in fact a not too well-qualified and fairly junior staff member.
The committee Chair will also recruit two or three ‘specialist advisors’, usually outside professionals or
university academics, who are paid tiny amounts to advise the chair and clerk on issues and people for the
committee to talk to. This leaves the committees very reliant on calling witnesses, taking oral evidence, and
making the odd visit here or there, as their main ways of gathering evidence – an essentially nineteenth
century model of investigation.
It would not be hard to bring in better methods of information gathering, at little or no net additional cost. The
National Audit Office already has teams of researchers covering each of the Whitehall departments, and
masses of information that never gets considered by PAC or makes its way into the public domain via the
NAO’s now increasingly abbreviated and rather vague reports. The whole of the NAO’s £80 million annual
budget (covering 750 staff) also produces just 60 ‘value for money’ reports that funnel through one single
Commons committee, PAC. Given the fiscal stress on UK government for the next five years, an attractive
way of NAO beginning to deliver more value for money for taxpayers would be for their departmental-
monitoring teams to also begin to advise the relevant select committee on where to look and what to ask
about policy implementation.
A more far-reaching reform would be for the Public Accounts Committee to stop trying to consider any single-
department reports, which should be handled by the relevant select committee instead. This would leave the
PAC free to develop its really critical and unique roles of covering all cross-departmental issues (like
monitoring spending cuts, or combating the information technology disasters plaguing UK government),
taxation and the some big-spending zones (like defence spending and the Department of Work and
Pensions benefits systems) in a more professional and focused way.
